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Abstract— One of the main challenges faced by a user today
is protecting their privacy, especially during widespread surveil-
lance. This led to the development of privacy infrastructures
whose main purpose is to guarantee users privacy. However,
they are being misused by attackers who consider them to be
an exploitable resource to perform illegitimate activities. This
paper proposes to analyze and assess the threats that occur
due to subverting privacy infrastructures. It begins with an
outline of critical privacy infrastructures that were developed.
An overview of rising threats of subverting the most prominent
privacy infrastructure, Tor is presented. Additionally, a brief
assessment of the severity of these threats is discussed and
the paper concludes by recommending the scope for further
research to mitigate the risks due to such threats.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the rapid usage and development of Internet,
privacy has become a major concern for individuals, particu-
larly in case of widespread surveillance. With the flexibility
and advancement of communication technologies, the open
nature of Internet also encouraged illegitimate activities such
as prying on users personal information, selling information
to advertising companies, exploiting information by govern-
ment agencies thereby compromising the privacy of user
information. Hence, privacy infrastructures emerged as a
solution. (ALSABAH and GOLDBERG 2016) Tor, acronym
for the Onion Router is an example of such a system. VPN,
Proxy servers, Remailers, JAP, I2P are few other examples.
These systems are responsible for hiding the identities of
communicating parties from their peers, as well as from
the adversaries who intend to eavesdrop the traffic flowing
through the network. Among them, VPN, proxy servers,
TOR and I2P are actively used. (Chakravarty 2014)(Bing-
dong Li 2013). The success of privacy infrastructures further
encouraged the attackers to perform illegal activities by
subverting these infrastructures through sophisticated botnets
and ransomware.
Botnets are generally used by attackers to perform ma-
licious activities such as DDoS, personal data theft, spam,
bitcoin mining and cyber-espionage. Botnets are centralized
overlay networks in which Command-and-Control (C&C)
servers are a single entity responsible for control. Bots
connect to these servers to be reachable and a botmaster
exists that manages the bots and is aware of the overlay
network structure. Major disadvantage in this architecture
is that the C&C servers act as a single point of failure.
Hence, if the C&C servers are compromised, the complete
botnet is defeated. Attackers have resorted to this problem by
adopting a more resilient unstructured P2P network that has
a distributed architecture, or using improved techniques to
reduce the detection capability of the C&C servers. The latter
was achieved by taking advantage of the anonymity features
of Tor network. Through Tor, a botmaster can access the
C&C servers anonymously and an encrypted routing system
is created to avoid detection through traffic analysis. More-
over, Tor provides hidden services in which the client does
not need to know the actual address or location of the service,
and botmasters can configure the C&C servers as hidden
services. (Casenove and Miraglia 2014).In this paper, we
will briefly describe an overview of privacy infrastructures,
rising threats of subverting these infrastructures and assess
the criticality of such threats based on its capabilities and
previous attacks.
II. OVERVIEW OF PRIVACY INFRASTRUCTURES
A. Proxy Servers
A proxy server is used for surfing the web, wherein it
acts as an intermediary between the client and server, and
client requests are sent with the proxy servers identity rather
than that of the real user thereby hiding the users identity.
Due to this, the destination server does not log the real IP
address and other device information of user. It is not very
prominent for anonymous communication because it can be
easily attacked or traced. Before the traffic is sent to the
proxy, it has to travel through the ISPs physical network,
making it susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. An at-
tacker can monitor the traffic between user and proxy server
and obtain sensitive information. (Towards an Autonomous
System Monitor for Mitigating Correlation Attacks in the Tor
Network 2016) (Erdin 2012) (Bingdong Li 2013)
B. Remailers
Remailers are servers which forwards to destination the
messages it receives with embedded instructions, without
revealing the senders information. In particular, remailers
manipulate the addresses in the e-mail headers of the trans-
mitting node with fake addresses. Hence anonymity in e-
mails are achieved. Remailers are of three types, Type I
(Cypherpunk) that forwards messages to several servers be-
fore sending it to the destination and provides multiple layer
encryption through PGP public keys, Type II (Mixmaster)
which includes padding, message pools and is more resistant
to traffic analysis, Type III (MixMinion) which is most secure
due to free routing algorithm. (Towards an Autonomous
System Monitor for Mitigating Correlation Attacks in the
Tor Network 2016) (Erdin 2012) (Bingdong Li 2013)
C. Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Unlike proxy server, VPN server provides secured commu-
nication to the destination by encrypting the traffic between
the user and server. The traffic is encrypted irrespective of
the type of application being used, thus mitigating the risks
of attacks such as man-in-the-middle. Even though it offers
secured communication when compared to proxy server,
users privacy is not guaranteed. There are many cases where
VPN providers share users information for business profits.
(Erdin 2012)
D. Onion Routing
It is the most prevalent design for low latency communi-
cations. The protocol consists of a structure similar to that
of an onion, where message is encapsulated with layer by
layer encryption. In this mechanism, there is a set of servers
called onion routers that is responsible to relay traffic to
the clients. Every node has a public and private key. The
public key is known to the client in order to set the path of
communication. Initially, the client constructs an encrypted
tunnel called circuit using public-key cryptography. Once it
is set, symmetric key cryptography is used to transfer the
data. This protocol has different variations such as Onion
Router(TOR) and Invisible Internet Project(I2P) (Erdin 2012)
1) Invisible Internet Project (I2P): It is an alternative
to TOR that supports all regular internet activities such as
e-mail, web browsing. Unlike TOR, I2P is more focused
on accessing closed darknet rather than the regular Internet
websites. I2P offers anonymity services to identity-sensitive
applications by building an overlay network of volunteer
systems. It is strictly based on UDP, but security can be
achieved by including the libraries that allow reliable stream
communication on top of the I2P network. It is a closed
system in which traffic is routed through other peers and
by announcing its peers, it enables new users to join the
network. Many applications such as email, peer-to-peer, IRC
interact with I2P but it is usually not preferred for low latency
applications due to the lack of focus in end-to-end delay.
(Bingdong Li 2013) (Tails 2016)
2) Onion Router (TOR) : Tor is a low latency anonymity
overlay network that is known to be the most robust privacy
tool. It is helpful in preventing user discovery to any entities
that are monitoring the network. When packets are trans-
mitted between the user and a destination host, a random
path with three nodes are used so that no single node is
aware of the complete transmission process thereby provid-
ing anonymity. Furthermore, TOR connections are encrypted
using TLS protocol. However, connection between exit node
and destination is not encrypted and hence exit nodes can
observe the content of messages. (Bingdong Li 2013)
Functioning of TOR: The directory authorities in TOR
are centralized, trusted servers that track the complete TOR
network. Nodes or routers are voluntary computers that are
distributed and categorized based on their respective func-
tionality and positions. Before transmitting the data packets
to the destination node, it is encrypted several times using
public key cryptography. At every relay, one encryption layer
is decrypted, which reveals the IP address of the next relay
that the packet needs to be forwarded to. This is done until
the packet reaches the destination and the reverse process is
followed for messages sent to the client. The clients privacy
is maintained,since without the ability to analyze traffic,
none of the relays can detect the corresponding message’s
sender and destination. Through the hidden services feature,
services are accessible to anyone with a Tor client without
revealing any knowledge about the IP address or location
of the server.For additional security, the Tor client does
not select same router or relays in the same /16 subnet to
be in the same circuit. Tors telescopic approach to circuit
establishment has two major benefits, one of which is that
perfect forward secrecy is achieved due to discarding the
session keys when circuit is closed. The other benefit is that,
routers need not store the hashes of previously processed
onions to prevent replay attacks since replaying one side of
a Diffie- Hellman handshake results in a different key which
is not of any use to the attacker. (Bingdong Li 2013)
E. Java Anonymous Proxy (JAP)
JAP is a low latency mix cascades that uses the server
provided by volunteers to access the Internet. Several mixes
are used to encrypt the packet and maintain the rate of traffic
constant in order to avoid rate-based traffic analysis. The
program can display all the active mixes from which user
can choose the JAP cascades. (Erdin 2012) JAP software is
available from many years and is second in popularity after
Tor. Commercially, it is called JonDonym.
III. RISING THREATS OF SUBVERTING PRIVACY
INFRASTRUCTURE
Among the privacy infrastructures mentioned, Tor pro-
vides highest anonymity. The stealthiness and untraceability
features of Tor motivated the attackers to take advantage of
this capability and develop Tor-based botnets. By placing
the botnet infrastructure in Tor, the Tor hidden services
provides anonymous C&C servers which is difficult to detect
or destroy. Furthermore, attacking the server with DDoS
seems unfeasible as it would result in the attack of complete
Tor network.
A. Tor-based Botnets [Past Work]
The idea of hiding botnets in Tor was discussed in 2010,
in particular at the DefCon18 (D.Brown 2010) where a C&C
server anonymity implementation using Tor was shown by
DannisBrown. Later in 2012, Guarnieri in (Guarnieri 2012)
detected and analyzed the first Tor-based botnet. The botnet
was a modified version of Zeus consisting of DDoS, bitcoin
mining and credential theft capabilities. The malware com-
prised of Zeus bot, Tor client, GMinerbitcoin mining tool,
and few libraries for GPU hash cracking. The bots ran inside
hidden services and all C&C communication was within the
Tor network. The botmaster tried to reduce the traceability
by avoiding the use of exit nodes, and used IRC protocol to
communicate and issue commands to the bots. The botmaster
also made the bots act as relays thereby exploiting and
enhancing the Tor network simultaneously. In 2013, due to
a post on the Tor mailing list, Tor’s network usage and the
number of users accessing grew rapidly. Researchers couldnt
explain the reason at first but on analysis came to conclusion
that it was due to a large botnet that suddenly switched to Tor.
The botnet used centralized structure with HTTP protocol
and a preconfigured earlier version of Tor to connect to
the network. The significant increase in the amount of Tor
communication that was being established through relays
resulted in the reduction of Tor systems responsiveness.
(Casenove and Miraglia 2014)
Similarly,in the last few years, various types of botnets
were found in (Constantin 2012) (Dunn 2013) (Gottesman
2014)that made use of Tor infrastructure. It provided a
hideout for malware by deploying the command and control
server as a hidden service with specific onion address that the
other bots are configured with. Such botnets and referencing
the ones mentioned earlier as well, result in significant
degradation in the performance of Tor. One other example is
the spike caused by Mevade/Sefnit botnet in 2013. The spike
was close to 600% increase in the number of clients, causing
a network overload through C&C descriptors and creating
circuit requests. (ALSABAH and GOLDBERG 2016)
B. OnionBots [Future Threat]
According to (Sanatinia and Noubir 2015), onion bots are
believed to be the next generation of resilient and stealthy
botnets. It uses privacy infrastructures such as Tor to stay
undetected and decouple itself from the infected hosts. Since
onion bots are different from the peer-to-peer botnets, the
existing solutions that are used for the peer-to-peer bot are
not applicable to onion bots. The design is also resilient
to the current mitigation and analysis techniques such as
botnet mapping, hijacking and assessing the botnet size.
Moreover, it is also proven to achieve low diameter, degree
and high resiliency and repair if any event of a take-down
of a fraction of botnet node occurs. Anonymity is achieved
through the periodically changing address of the bot during
waiting stage. Unlike current botnets, secure communications
is achieved by encryption in OnionBot through Tor and
SSL. The threat environment will continue to grow due to
its capability to offer new services such as botnet-for-rent
and distribution computation platform for rent. By taking
advantage of payment through Bitcoins, Silk Road 2.0 in
Tor business operations can be carried out and botnets can
be instructed to perform CPU intensive operations such
as bitcoin mining or password cracking. Furthermore, the
estimated threats due to OnionBots could be higher since
they are robust to partitioning even when large fraction of
these bots are taken down simultaneously. (Sanatinia and
Noubir 2015) (Chaabane, Manils and Kaafar 2010)
C. Threats due to ransomware
According to (Cygnus Business Media Inc. 2015) ,threats
due to ransomware are one of the biggest threats. In ran-
somware, the user machine is infected and files and ap-
plications are held hostage until a fee is paid. The threat
is very high because ransomware is an automatic customer
service-type model where the malware will install and then
victim can pay through bitcoins. It doesnt involve any human
interaction for payment process.Cryptolocker and Cryptowall
are two of the ransomwares mentioned in (Cygnus Business
Media Inc. 2015).Furthermore, the report also states that
malware economy is ever growing and ransomware and
cryptocurrency such as bitcoins are helping attacker monetize
their actions.
IV. THREAT ASSESSMENT
According to the survey of anonymity technologies in
(Bingdong Li 2013), newer systems such as Tor, I2P are
gaining popularity. Among the current anonymity systems,
Tor networks have more number of volunteers than I2P.
From previous attacks it is evident that, Botnet over Tor is
growing and among all the privacy infrastructures threats due
to subverting Tor will be highest. According to (Casenove
and Miraglia 2014), even though botnets over Tor is good
solution it is still not perfect. They do not provide ultimate
resilience and even with Tor, a centralized botnet can have
vulnerability such as single point of failure. When a botnet
is integrated with the Tor infrastructure, a lot of attention is
raised as it creates instability in a stable network such as Tor.
Hence when a botnet comprising of millions of nodes joins
the Tor network in a short span, it can be easily detected.
Even from a client point of view, a botnet using Tor can
leave traces. A malware runs Tor client as external process
and if the client was not installed previously, exposure of
malware activity would be trivial. By cross verifying the
running processes, malware can be detected by identifying
the Tor client process. By using such detection techniques,
the estimated threat due to the tor-based-botnets can be
greatly reduced. In case of OnionBot, the estimated level of
threat is very high due to its robust nature and anonymity. By
using the suggested mitigation technique Sybil Onion Attack
Protocol (SOAP), the botnets can be neutralized. This might
reduce the risk due to such bots but due to the continuous
development of various variants of such botnets, threats due
to these corresponding models also increases. Successful
removal of such threats may not be guaranteed but measures
to reduce the threats effectiveness and mitigation of risks due
to such threats need to be addressed.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, various kinds of privacy infrastructures are
discussed and the rising threats of subverting the privacy
infrastructure are analyzed.Since Tor is the most prominent
privacy infrastructure, it is attracting more threats.Major
threat is due to botnet over Tor infrastructure which has been
the basis for prominent botnet attacks since 2010.Severity
of threats with respect to new variations of botnets such as
OnionBots are high due to its robustness and resiliency.Since
research with respect to Onionbots propose effective mitiga-
tion techniques such as SOAP,risk due to the exploitation of
these threats can be reduced but not completely avoided.
Moreover, the severity of threats is still high. With the
rapid development of various robust botnet variants, design
mitigation strategies need to be implemented rapidly and
effectively. Further research is recommended to achieve
effectiveness in detection and mitigation of threats due to
these infrastructures.
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